

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

MICHELLE ROBINSON, BOX BUTTE)
COUNTY ASSESSOR,)
)
Appellant,)
)
v.)
)
BOX BUTTE COUNTY BOARD OF)
EQUALIZATION)
)
and)
)
FRANK & LUPE COX,)
)
Appellees.)

Case No. 09R 021

DECISION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE BOX BUTTE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Michelle Robinson Box Butte County Assessor ("County Assessor") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Hampton Inn, 301 W Hwy 26, Scottsbluff, Nebraska, on June 3, 2010, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued February 26, 2010. Commissioner Wickersham, Chairperson of the Commission, was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Warnes was absent. Commissioner Wickersham, as Chairperson, designated Commissioners Wickersham, Salmon, and Hotz as a panel of the Commission to hear the appeal. Commissioner Hotz was excused. Commissioner Salmon was present. The appeal was heard by a quorum of a panel of the Commission.

Michelle Robinson, Box Butte County Assessor, was present at the hearing. James L. Zimmerman appeared as legal counsel for the County Assessor.

No one appeared on behalf of the Box Butte County Board of Equalization ("the County Board").

Neither Frank or Lupe Cox (“Taxpayers”) were present at the hearing. No one appeared as legal counsel for the Taxpayers.

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits, and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Reissue 2009). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

I. ISSUES

The County Assessor has asserted that taxable value of the subject property as of January 1, 2009, is not equalized with the taxable value of other real property. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining the equalized taxable value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary;

Whether the equalized taxable value of the subject property was determined by the County Board in a manner and an amount that is uniform and proportionate as required by Nebraska’s Constitution in Article VIII §1; and

The equalized taxable value of the subject property on January 1, 2009.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The County Assessor may maintain the appeal.

- 2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains ("the Subject Property") is described in the table below.
- 3. Actual value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2009, ("the assessment date") by the Box Butte County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely protest, and actual value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

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Description: Lot 2 Blk 1, Countryside Addition, Alliance, Box Butte County, Nebraska.

	Assessor Notice Value	Taxpayer Protest Value	Board Determined Value
Land	\$7,053.00	Unknown	\$7,053.00
Improvement	\$114,555.00	\$98,308.00	\$100,585.00
Total	\$121,608.00	Unknown	\$107,638.00

- 4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
- 5. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on February 26, 2010, set a hearing of the appeal for June 3, 2010, at 10:00 a.m. MDST.
- 6. An Affidavit of Service, which appears in the records of the Commission, establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
- 7. Actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2009 is:

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Land value \$ 7,053.00

Improvement value \$100,585.00

Total value \$107,638.00.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions necessary to determine taxable value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(7) (Reissue 2009).
2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2009).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2009).
4. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.”
Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al., 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 (2002).
5. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2009).

6. All taxable real property, with the exception of agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Reissue 2009).
7. “Taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all real property and franchises as defined by the Legislature except as otherwise provided in or permitted by this Constitution.” *Neb. Const.*, Art. VIII, §1.
8. Equalization is the process of ensuring that all taxable property is placed on the assessment rolls at a uniform percentage of its actual value. *MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal.*, 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).
9. The purpose of equalization of assessments is to bring the assessment of different parts of a taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one of the parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of the tax. *MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal.*, 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991); *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999).
10. Equalization to obtain proportionate valuation requires a comparison of the ratio of assessed to actual value for the subject property and comparable property. See *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999).
11. Uniformity requires that whatever methods are used to determine actual or taxable value for various classifications of real property that the results be correlated to show uniformity. *Banner County v. State Board of Equalization*, 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 (1987).

12. Property must be assessed uniformly and proportionately, even though the result may be that it is assessed at less than the actual value. *Equitable Life v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equal.*, 229 Neb. 60, 425 N.W.2d 320 (1988); *Fremont Plaza v. Dodge County Bd. of Equal.*, 225 Neb. 303, 405 N.W.2d 555 (1987).
13. The constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation extends to both rate and valuation. *First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Lancaster*, 177 Neb. 390, 128 N.W.2d 820 (1964).
14. In the evaluation of real property for tax purposes, where buildings and improvements are taxable as a part of the real estate, the critical issue is the actual value of the entire property, not the proportion of that value which is allocated to the land or to the buildings and improvements by the appraiser. *Bumgarner v. Valley County*, 208 Neb. 361, 303 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
15. If taxable values are to be equalized it is necessary for an appellant to establish by clear and convincing evidence that valuation placed on the property when compared with valuations placed on similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty, and not mere error of judgement. There must be something more, something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity. *Newman v. County of Dawson*, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959).
16. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).

17. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, an appellant has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization, fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes, is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
18. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
19. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
20. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
21. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
22. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).
23. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).

24. “An owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth is permitted to testify as to its value.” *U. S. Ecology v. Boyd County Bd. Of Equalization*, 256 Neb. 7, 16, 588 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1999).
25. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the appellant establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 580 N.W.2d 561 (1998).
26. An appellant, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by the County Board, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).
27. An appellant must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. Cf. *Lincoln Tel. and Tel. Co. v. County Bd. Of Equalization of York County*, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981); *Arenson v. Cedar County*, 212 Neb. 62, 321 N.W.2d 427 (1982).

IV. ANALYSIS

The subject property is an improved parcel. The improvements on the subject property are a 1,150 square foot, split level, single family residence with a 528 square foot finished basement, and an attached 480 square foot garage, and a 100 square foot yard shed. (E2:2).

The County Board equalized taxable value of the subject property with the taxable value of a comparison parcel.

The physical characteristics, attributes and amenities of the subject property and the parcel presented by the Taxpayer for comparison, with assessment information, is summarized in the following table.

Descriptor	Subject	Parcel 1
Exhibit	E2:1-2	E2:6-7
Location	1120 West 14th	1447 Colorado
Lot Size	8,298	10,400
Condition	Av +	Average
Quality	Av	Average
Yr Built	1977	1976
Exterior Walls	95% Hardboard 5% Masonry Veneer	100% Steel Siding
Style	Split level	Split level
Area Above Ground	1,150	1,048
Roof Cover	Comp Shingle	Comp Shingle
HVAC	100% warm & cooled	100% warn & cooled
Basement	528	528
Finished	528	528
Bedrooms	3	3
Bathrooms	2	2
Garage Type	Attached	Attached
Garage Area	480	480
Misc Imp	Wood Deck, Yard Shed	Wood Deck, Yard Shed
Lot Value	\$7,053	\$8,840

Imp Value	\$114,555	\$98,798
Taxable Value	\$121,608 ¹	\$107,638

1. As determined by the County Assessor

The comparison parcel is 102 square feet smaller than the subject property and has steel siding. The subject property lot is 2,102 square feet smaller than the comparison parcel lot, however, the difference in lot size does not significantly affect the contribution to value made by the land (\$7,053 subject versus \$8,840 comparable). The parcels are highly comparable. Parcels that are highly comparable should have taxable values that are substantially the same.

The County Assessor testified that an error was made in the valuation of the comparison parcel. The comparison parcel was valued at \$94 per square foot. (E2:7). The subject property was valued by the County Assessor at \$100 per square foot. (E2:2). The per square foot value for each parcel should have been determined based on a table received as Exhibit 2 page 8. The table uses three factors to determine the per square foot value of a residence, the year built, the quality of construction and the condition as found on inspection. The residences on the subject property and the comparison parcel were built in 1976 and 1977 and fall in the same year range 1970 to 1979. Both are average quality. The subject property's condition is average+ the condition of the comparison parcel is average. If the comparison parcel had been properly valued based on the table received as Exhibit 2 page 8 its value would have been found in the range of 100 to 110 the range used to determine the per square foot value of the subject property. If that per square foot value range had been applied to the comparison parcel, its taxable value would have been substantially the same as the taxable value of the subject property.

Nebraska's Constitution requires that taxes be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately. *Neb. Const.*, art. VIII, §1. Proportionality can be determined through a comparison of the ratio of taxable to actual value for a parcel with the ratio of taxable value to actual value of another parcel. *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999). Uniformity requires that, whatever methods are used to determine actual or taxable value for various classifications of real property, the results be correlated to show uniformity. *Banner County v. State Board of Equalization*, 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 (1987). Courts in Nebraska have, on review of equalization claims, placed a burden on a Taxpayer "to establish by clear and convincing evidence that valuation placed on his or her property when compared with valuations placed on similar property is grossly excessive and is (the) *sic* result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty, and not mere error of judgement." *Scribante v. Douglas County Board of Equalization*, 8 Neb. App. 25, 36, 588 N.W.2d 190, 197 (1999).

The County Board is required to act when necessary to equalize taxable values. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1501 (Cum. Supp. 2004). The rationale for that authority has been clearly and succinctly expressed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. "In all schemes of taxation there are generally recognized elements of inequality and the probability of erroneous valuations in the assessment of property by whatever mode the assessment may be made. The evil is usually remedied by the exercise of the authority of a board created for that purpose, whereby the assessment of different properties is brought to a common standard of value." *State ex rel. Morton v. Back*, 72 Neb. 402, 406, 100 N.W. 952, 954 (1904). The County Assessor is required to report undervalued lands to the County Board. Neb. Rev. §77-1315.01 (Cum. Supp 2004).

The County Board may adjust the value of undervalued parcels. Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1504 (Supp 2005).

The County Assessor testified that she became aware an error had occurred in the assessment of the comparison parcel on July 8, 2009. The County Assessor did not report the undervaluation of the comparison parcel to the County Board. A process was available to the Assessor and County Board for correction of the assessment of the comparison parcel prior to July 25, 2005. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1315.01 (Cum. Supp 2004) and Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1504 (Supp 2005). The remedy however had to be initiated by the County Assessor. The County Assessor failed to initiate the remedy. Failure to act in this instance was a plain failure to discharge a legal duty. The remedy, if a lack of equalization is shown, is a taxable value that reflects the lowest equalized value. See *Kearney Convention Center v. Buffalo County Board of Equalization*, 216 Neb. 292, 304 N.W.2d 620 (1984).

The County Board on July 21, 2009 acted in the only manner it could and equalized taxable value of the subject property and the comparison parcel.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The County Assessor has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.

4. The County Assessor has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining equalized taxable value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2009, is affirmed.
2. Equalized taxable value, for the tax year 2009, of the subject property is:

Case No. 09R 021

Land value \$ 7,053.00

Improvement value \$100,585.00

Total value \$107,638.00.

3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Box Butte County Treasurer, and the Box Butte County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Reissue 2009).
4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2009.

7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on July 7, 2010.

Nancy J. Salmon, Commissioner

SEAL

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (REISSUE 2009), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.

I concur in the result.

The analysis above considers two standards of review for review. One standard of review is stated as a presumption found in case law, the other is found as stated in statute. I do not believe consideration of two standards of review are required by statute or case law.

The Commission is an administrative agency of state government. See *Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital v. Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission*, 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). As an administrative agency of state government the Commission has only the powers and authority granted to it by statute. *Id.* The Commission is authorized by statute to review appeals from decisions of a county board of equalization, the Tax Commissioner, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). In general, the Commission may only grant relief on appeal if it is shown that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(8) (Cum. Supp. 2008).

The Commission is authorized to review decision of a county board of equalization determining taxable values. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). Review of county board of equalization decisions is not new in Nebraska law. As early as 1903 Nebraska Statutes provided

for review of County Board assessment decisions by the district courts. Laws 1903, c. 73 §124. The statute providing for review did not state a standard for that review. *Id.* A standard of review stated as a presumption was adopted by Nebraska's Supreme Court. See *State v. Savage*, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902) (citing *Dixon Co. v. Halstead*, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888) and *State v. County Board of Dodge Co.* 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887). The presumption was that the County Board had faithfully performed its official duties and had acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. See *id.* In 1959, the legislature provided a statutory standard for review by the district courts of county board of equalization, assessment decisions. 1959 Neb Laws, LB 55, §3. The statutory standard of review required the District Court to affirm the decision of the county board of equalization unless the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable or the value as established was too low. *Id.* The statutory standard of review was codified in section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1511 (Cum. Supp. 1959). After adoption of the statutory standard of review Nebraska Courts have held that the provisions of section 77-5011 of the Nebraska Statutes created a presumption that the County Board has faithfully performed its official duties and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. See, e.g., *Ideal Basic Indus. V. Nuckolls Cty. Bd. Of Equal.*, 231 Neb. 653, 437 N.W.2d 501 (1989). The presumption stated by the Court was the presumption that had been found before the statute was enacted.

Many appeals of decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 were decided without reference to the statutory standard of review applicable to the district courts review of a county board of equalization's decision. See, e.g., *Grainger Brothers Company v. County Board of Equalization of the County of Lancaster*, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966). In *Hastings*

Building Co., v. Board of Equalization of Adams County, 190 Neb. 63, 206 N.W.2d 338 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that two standards of review existed for reviews by the district court; one statutory requiring a finding that the decision reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary, and another judicial requiring a finding that a presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully performed its official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence was overcome. No attempt was made by the *Hastings* Court to reconcile the two standards of review that were applicable to the District Courts.

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission was created in 1995. 1995 Neb. Laws, LB 490 §153. Section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes was made applicable to review of county board of equalization assessment decisions by the Commission. *Id.* In 2001 section 77-1511 of Nebraska Statutes was repealed. 2001 Neb. Laws, LB 465, §12. After repeal of section 77-1511 the standard for review to be applied by the Commission in most appeals was stated in section 77-5016 of the Nebraska Statutes. Section 77-5016(8) requires a finding that the decision being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Brenner v. Banner County Board of Equalization*, 276 Neb. 275, 753 N.W.2d 802 (2008). The Supreme Court has stated that the presumption which arose from section 77-1511 is applicable to the decisions of the Commission. *Garvey Elevators, Inc. V. Adams County Bd. of Equalization*, 261 Neb. 130, 621 N.W.2d 518 (2001).

The possible results from application of the presumption as a standard of review and the statutory standard of review are: (1) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (2) the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (3) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is overcome; (4) and finally the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is overcome. The first possibility does not

allow a grant of relief, neither standard of review has been met. The second possibility does not therefore allow a grant of relief even though the presumption is overcome because the statutory standard remains. See *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The third possibility requires analysis. The presumption and the statutory standard of review are different legal standards, and the statutory standard remains after the presumption has been overcome. See *id.* The burden of proof to overcome the presumption is competent evidence. *Id.* Clear and convincing evidence is required to show that a county board of equalization's decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g., *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002). Competent evidence that the county board of equalization failed to perform its duties or act upon sufficient competent evidence is not always evidence that the county board of equalization acted unreasonably or arbitrarily because the statutory standard of review remains even if the presumption is overcome. *City of York, supra.* Clear and convincing evidence that a county board of equalization's determination, action, order, or decision was unreasonable or arbitrary, as those terms have been defined, may however overcome the presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully discharged its duties and acted on sufficient competent evidence. In any event the statutory standard has been met and relief may be granted. Both standards of review are met in the fourth possibility and relief may be granted.

Use of the presumption as a standard of review has been criticized. See G. Michael Fenner, *About Presumptions in Civil Cases*, 17 Creighton L. Rev. 307 (1984). In the view of that author, the presumption should be returned to its roots as a burden of proof. *Id.* Nebraska's Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of using two standards of review and classified the

presumption in favor of the county board of equalization as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. See *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). Use of the *Gordman* analysis allows consideration of both the presumption and the statutory standard of review without the difficulties inherent in the application of two standards of review. It is within that framework that I have analyzed the evidence.

Wm R. Wickersham, Commissioner