



5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

**I.  
ISSUES**

The Taxpayer has asserted that taxable value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, is less than taxable value as determined by the County Board. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining taxable value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

The taxable value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.

**II.  
FINDINGS OF FACT**

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains is described as PT NE¼ (EX 6.18 & Lateral) Section 15, Township 12, Range 53, 130.16 A, Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, ("the subject property").
3. Taxable value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2007, ("the assessment date") by the Scotts Bluff County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely protest, and taxable value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

Description: PT NE¼ (EX 6.18 & Lateral) Section 15, Township 12, Range 53, 130.16 A, Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska.

	Assessor Notice Value	Taxpayer Protest Value	Board Determined Value
Agricultural Land	\$77,586.00	\$57,500.00	\$77,586.00
Total	\$77,586.00	\$57,500.00	\$77,586.00

4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
5. The County Board was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
6. The Taxpayer was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
7. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on January 31, 2008, set a hearing of the appeal for May 20, 2008, at 8:00 a.m. MDST.
8. An Affidavit of Service which appears in the records of the Commission establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
9. Taxable value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2007 is:

Agricultural land	<u>\$77,586.00</u>
Total	<u>\$77,586.00.</u>

### III. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions necessary to determine taxable value. Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5016 (7) (Supp. 2007).

2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
4. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.”  
*Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 ( 2002).
5. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2003).
6. All taxable real property, with the exception of agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
7. Agricultural land and horticultural land shall be valued for purposes of taxation at seventy five percent of its actual value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201 (2) (Cum. Supp. 2006).

8. Agricultural land and horticultural land means a parcel of land which is primarily used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, including wasteland lying in or adjacent to and in common ownership or management with other agricultural land and horticultural land. Agricultural land and horticultural land does not include any land directly associated with any building or enclosed structure." Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1359 (1) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
9. "Agricultural or horticultural purposes means used for the commercial production of any plant or animal product in a raw or unprocessed state that is derived from the science and art of agriculture, aquaculture, or horticulture. Agricultural or horticultural purposes includes the following uses of land:
  - (a) Land retained or protected for future agricultural or horticultural purposes under a conservation easement as provided in the Conservation and Preservation Easements Act except when the parcel or a portion thereof is being used for purposes other than agricultural or horticultural purposes; and
  - (b) Land enrolled in a federal or state program in which payments are received for removing such land from agricultural or horticultural production shall be defined as agricultural land or horticultural land." Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1359 (2) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
10. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
11. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that

action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).

12. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
13. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
14. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
15. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
16. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).
17. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).

18. “An owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth is permitted to testify as to its value.” *U. S. Ecology v. Boyd County Bd. Of Equalization*, 256 Neb. 7, 16, 588 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1999).
19. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the taxpayer establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 580 N.W.2d 561 (1998).
20. A Taxpayer, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by county assessor, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).
21. Taxpayer must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. Cf. *Lincoln Tel. and Tel. Co. v. County Bd. Of Equalization of York County*, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981); *Arenson v. Cedar County*, 212 Neb. 62, 321 N.W.2d 427 (1982) (determination of equalized values); and *Josten-Wilbert Vault Co. v. Board of Equalization for Buffalo County*, 179 Neb. 415, 138 N.W.2d 641 (1965) (determination of actual value).

#### **IV. ANALYSIS**

The Subject Property is 130.18 acres of unimproved agricultural land and horticultural land in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska. The Subject Property was purchased by the Taxpayer with a center pivot irrigation system and other personal property necessary for use of the center

pivot, in December 2006 for \$115,000.00. (E2 and E3). The Taxpayer and the Seller's realtor allocated \$40,000.00 of the purchase price to the center pivot and the other personal property. The Taxpayer filed a personal property tax schedule for the year 2007 showing that the cost of the center pivot and other personal property was \$40,000.00. (E5).

The Taxpayer asserts that actual value of the Subject Property was \$75,000.00 as of January 1, 2007. The Taxpayer arrived at that value by deducting the value assigned to the center pivot and other personal property (\$40,000.00) from the total purchase price (\$115,000.00 - \$40,000.00 = \$75,000.00). Agricultural land and horticultural land is to be taxed at 75% of its actual value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201 (2) (Cum. Supp. 2006). The resulting taxable value of the Subject Property would then be \$56,250.00 ( $\$75,000.00 \times .75 = \$56,250.00$ ).

SV value of the Subject Property for the tax year 2006 was \$81,346.00. (E12:21). MV value of the subject property for the tax year 2006 was \$96,373.00. (E12:21). SV value equals taxable value for the year 2006. (E12:21). Taxable value as protested by the Taxpayer was \$77,586.00. (E12:11 and E9:4). On or before June 1 of each year the county assessor is required to provide each owner of real property as of May 20 with notice of any change in assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1315 (Cum. Supp. 2006). Failure to give notice as required renders any increase to taxable value void. *Rosenberg v. Douglas County*, 123 Neb. 803, 244 N.W. 398 (1932). A letter explaining the County's process for mailing notices of valuation changes was received as Exhibit 12 page 19. The County has also produced a computer list of those persons to whom notice should have been sent. (E12:20). A presumption of mailing and receipt arises when it is shown that the notice was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed. *Troy & Stalder Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.*, 206 Neb. 28, 290 N.W.2d 809 (1980). Direct proof of actual

deposit with an authorized U.S. Postal Service official or in an authorized depository or proof of a course of an individual or office practice that notice, which are properly addressed and stamped, are placed in a certain receptacle from which an authorized individual invariably collects and places all outgoing mail in a regular U.S. mail depository and that such procedure was actually followed on the date of the alleged mailing creates an inference that a notice was properly addressed with sufficient postage attached and deposited in such receptacle was regularly transmitted and presents a question for the trier of fact to decide. *See, Houska v. City of Wahoo*, 235 Neb. 635, 641, 456 N.W.2d 750, 754 (1990). If a statute requires mailing by an official only a proper mailing by that official is a basis for a presumption that the mailed item was received. *Nye v. Fire Group Partnership*, 263 Neb. 735, 642 N.W.2d 149 (2002). In this appeal the only evidence of mailing was a letter explaining the mailing process and the computer list. The letter does not describe all of the elements necessary to give rise to the presumption of mailing. As noted above, taxable value of the subject property for the tax year 2006 exceeded taxable value for the year 2007 as determined by the County Board. The remedy provided in *Rosenberg* is not appropriate in this appeal because taxable value decreased from the prior year.

The Taxpayer contends that the actual value of the subject property is established by its sale and purchase in 2006. It is true that the purchase price of property may be taken into consideration in determining the actual value thereof for assessment purposes, together with all other relevant elements pertaining to such issue; however, standing alone, it is not conclusive of the actual value of property for assessment purposes. Other matters relevant to the actual value thereof must be considered in connection with the sale price to determine actual value. Sale price is not synonymous with actual value or fair market value. *Forney v. Box Butte County Bd. of*

*Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 417, 582 N.W.2d 631 (1998). If however, the evidence discloses the circumstances surrounding the sale and shows that it was an arm's length transaction between a seller who was not under compulsion to sell and a buyer who was not compelled to buy, it should receive strong consideration.” *Potts v. Board of Equalization of Hamilton County*, 213 Neb. 37, 48, 328 N.W.2d 175, 328 (1982). There is evidence that the sale and purchase of the subject property was an arm's length transaction however it was a mixed transaction in that it concerned both the purchase of real property and personal property. The Taxpayer and an agent for the seller determined that \$40,000.00 was an appropriate allocation of the total purchase price to the personal property. The Taxpayer testified that the allocation was made without any knowledge on his part concerning actual value of the personal property. Any knowledge or expertise of the seller's agent that would be appropriate for a determination of actual value of the personal property is unknown. In short there appears to be no basis for the allocation of \$40,000.00 of the purchase price to personal property except that it was agreeable to the parties. That is an insufficient basis for a determination that actual value of the subject property could be determined by deduction of the personal property allocation from the total purchase price.

The Taxpayer also asserts that the County Assessor adopted his valuation of the personal property purchased with the subject property because \$40,000.00 was shown as the value of that property on a personal property tax schedule he filed for the tax year 2007. Taxable personal property is taxed on its net book value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(5) (Supp 2007). Net book value is the portion of Nebraska adjusted basis as determined based on a table contained in statute. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-120 (Reissue 2003). Nebraska adjusted basis is the adjusted basis of property as determined under the Internal Revenue Code, increased by the amount allowed under

the code for depreciation or amortization or pursuant to an election to expense depreciable property under section 179 of the code. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-117 (Reissue 2003) . Personal property tax schedules are prepared and filed by Taxpayers. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1229(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006). An assessor is not bound by a Taxpayer's filings and can initiate changes if given a basis for doing so. §77-1233.04(1) (Supp 2007). It is unnecessary to speculate whether the assessor will initiate a review of the Taxpayer's personal property tax schedule based on the evidence in this appeal. The Taxpayer' personal property tax schedule listed the commercial and industrial property rather than agricultural machinery and equipment. (E5:2). In this appeal the Taxpayer advised the Commission that the taxable value shown was not the purchase price, but was an amount based on provisions of the Internal Revenue Code applicable to its purchase of the land and personal property. (E5:1). A depreciation and amortization report shows that the basis for depreciation was \$15,909.00 (E5:4). It is enough to note again that the allocation made by the Taxpayer will not be relied on by the Commission in this appeal and that it is not binding on the assessor.

The only evidence that the decision of the County Board was unreasonable or arbitrary was the allocation by the Taxpayer of the purchase price of personal property and real property. For reasons noted above evidence of the Taxpayer's allocation of the purchase price is not an appropriate basis for determining actual value of the subject property and is not clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board was unreasonable or arbitrary. Also the evidence is not sufficient to determine that the County Board did not faithfully perform its duties or act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its action.

**V.  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.
4. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.  
ORDER**

**IT IS ORDERED THAT:**

1. The decision of the County Board determining taxable value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2007, is affirmed.
2. Taxable value, for the tax year 2007, of the subject property is:

Agricultural land	<u>\$77,586.00</u>
Total	<u>\$77,586.00.</u>
3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Scotts Bluff County Treasurer, and the Scotts Bluff County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.

5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2007.
7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on June 19, 2008.

**Signed and Sealed.** June 19, 2008.

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Robert W. Hotz, Commissioner

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William C. Warnes, Commissioner

**SEAL**

**APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (CUM. SUPP. 2006), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.**

I concur in the result.

The Commission is an administrative agency of state government. See, *Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital v. Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission*, 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). As an administrative agency of state government the Commission has only the powers and authority granted to it by statute. *Id.* The Commission is authorized by statute to review appeals from decisions of a county board of equalization, the Tax Commissioner, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). In general the Commission may only grant relief on appeal if it is shown that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(8) (Supp. 2007).

Nebraska courts have held that the provisions of section 77-5016(8) of the Nebraska Statutes create a presumption that the County Board has faithfully performed its official duties

and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. *City of York v. York County Board of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The presumption cited in *York* has roots in the early jurisprudence of Nebraska. See, *State v. Savage*, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902) (citing *Dixon Co. v. Halstead*, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888) and *State v. County Board of Dodge Co.* 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887)). As early as 1903 Nebraska Statutes provided for review of County Board assessment decisions by the district courts. Laws 1903, c. 73 §124. The statute providing for review did not state a standard for that review. *Id.*

In 1959 the legislature provided a statutory standard for review by the district courts of county board of equalization, assessment decisions. 1959 Neb Laws, LB 55, §3. The statutory standard of review required the district Court to affirm the decision of the county board of equalization unless the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable or the value as established was too low. *Id.* The statutory standard of review was codified in section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1511 (Cum. Supp. 1959). Review of district court decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 was de novo. *Future Motels, Inc. v. Custer County Board of Equalization*, 252 Neb. 565, 563 N.W.2d 785 (1997). The presumption functioned as a standard of review. See, e.g. *Gamboni v. County of Otoe*, 159 Neb. 417, 67 N.W.2d 492 (1954).

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission was created in 1995. 1995 Neb. Laws, LB 490 §153. Section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes was made applicable to review of county board of equalization assessment decisions by the Commission. *Id.* In 2001 section 77-1511 of Nebraska Statutes was repealed. 2001 Neb. Laws, LB 465, §12. After repeal of section 77-1511 the standard for review to be applied by the Commission in most appeals was stated in section 77-5016 of the Nebraska Statutes. Section 77-5016 requires a finding that the decision

being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. The basis for that determination is the evidence presented to the Commission in a new record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (Cum. Supp. 2006). Commission decisions are reviewed for error on the record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5019(5) (Cum. Supp. 2006). The statutory basis for Commission review and the review of its decisions is analogous to district courts review of decisions made by administrative agencies. The basis for district court review of decisions made by administrative agencies is de novo on the record. *Tyson Fresh Meats v. State*, 270 Neb. 535, 704 N.W.2d 788 (2005). The decisions of the district court examining the administrative decision are reviewed for error on the record. *Thorson v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs.*, 274 Neb. 322, 740 N.W.2d 27 (2007). The similarities are enough to suggest that the framework for review applied to district court decisions could be made applicable to decisions of the Commission.

Many appeals of decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 were decided without reference to the statutory standard of review applicable to the district courts. See, e.g. *Grainger Brothers Company v. County Board of Equalization of the County of Lancaster*, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966). As noted however review was de novo and the reviewing court was not bound by the standard of review imposed on district court. *Loskill v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 186 Neb. 707, 185 N.W.2d 852 (1971). In *Hastings Building Co., v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 190 Neb. 63, 206 N.W.2d 338 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that two standards of review existed for the district courts; one statutory, and the other judicial stated as a presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully performed its official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence. No attempt was

made by the *Hastings* Court to reconcile the two standards of review that were applicable to the district courts.

The possible results from application of the presumption and the statutory standard of review by the Commission are: (1) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (2) the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (3) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is overcome; (4) and finally the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is overcome. The first possibility does not allow a grant of relief, neither standard of review has been met. If the presumption is overcome the statutory standard remains. See, *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The second possibility does not therefore allow a grant of relief even though the presumption is overcome. The third possibility requires analysis. The presumption and the statutory standard of review are different legal standards, one remaining after the other has been met. See. *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The burden of proof to overcome the presumption is competent evidence. *City of York*, Supra. Clear and convincing evidence is required to show that a county board of equalization's decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002). Competent evidence that the county board of equalization failed to perform its duties or act upon sufficient competent evidence is not always evidence that the county board of equalization acted unreasonably or arbitrarily because the statutory standard of review remains even if the presumption is overcome. *City of York*, Supra. Clear and convincing evidence that a county board of equalization's determination, action, order, or decision was unreasonable or arbitrary, as those terms have been defined, may however

overcome the presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully discharged its duties and acted on sufficient competent evidence. In any event the statutory standard has been met and relief may be granted. Both standards of review are met in the fourth possibility and relief may be granted. Each analyses of the standards of review allowing a grant of relief requires a finding that the statutory standard has been met.

Use of the presumption as a standard of review has been criticized. See, G. Michael Fenner, *About Presumptions in Civil Cases*, 17 *Creighton L. Rev.* 307 (1984). In the view of that author the presumption should be returned to its roots as a burden of proof. *Id.* Nebraska's Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of using two standards of review and classified the presumption in favor of the county board of equalization as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. See, *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). Use of the *Gordman* analysis allows consideration of both the presumption and the statutory standard of review without the possible conflict or difficulties inherent in the application of two standards of review. The *Gordman* analysis requires the Commission to consider all of the evidence produced in order to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the decision, action, order, or determination being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. It is within that framework that I have analyzed the evidence.

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Wm R. Wickersham, Commissioner