

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

BENEDICT LAGER,)	
)	
Appellant,)	Case No. 11H 001
)	
v.)	DECISION AND ORDER
)	AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
SCOTTS BLUFF COUNTY BOARD OF)	THE SCOTTS BLUFF COUNTY BOARD
EQUALIZATION,)	OF EQUALIZATION
)	
Appellee.)	

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Benedict Lager ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Hampton Inn & Suites Scottsbluff, 301 W. Hwy. 26, Scottsbluff, Nebraska, on June 7, 2011, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued March 29, 2011 as amended by an Order dated June 1, 2011. Commissioner Wickersham, Chairperson of the Commission, was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Warnes was absent. Commissioner Wickersham, as Chairperson, designated Commissioners Wickersham, Salmon, and Hotz as a panel of the Commission to hear the appeal. Commissioner Hotz was excused. Commissioner Salmon was present. The appeal was heard by a quorum of a panel of the Commission.

Benedict Lager was present at the hearing. No one appeared as legal counsel for the Taxpayer.

Tiffany A. Wasserburger, a Deputy County Attorney for Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska appeared as legal counsel for the Scotts Bluff County Board of Equalization ("County Board").

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits, and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Reissue 2009). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

I. ISSUES

Is Benedict W. Lager an individual who may be granted a homestead exemption pursuant to section 77-3508 of Nebraska Statutes?

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. Benedict W. Lager applied for a homestead exemption as a disabled individual. (E2:13-15).
3. The parcel of real property to for which a homestead exemption was sought is Lot 8, Block 4 Park Manor Addition, Scottsbluff, Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska. (E2:13).
4. Benedict W. Lager's application for homestead exemption was rejected by the County Assessor. (E2:16).
5. Bernard W. Lager protested rejection of his application to the County Board. (E2:18).
6. The County Board denied the protest of Bernard W. Lager. (E2:19).
7. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.

8. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on March 29, 2011, as amended by an Order issued on June 1, 2011, set a hearing of the appeal for June 7, 2011, at 3:00 p.m. MDT.
9. An Affidavit of Service, which appears in the records of the Commission, establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
10. Benedict W. Lager does not have a disability qualifying him for a homestead exemption pursuant to section 77-3508 of Nebraska Statutes.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions issues raised during the county board of equalization proceedings. *Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 655, 584 N.W.2d 353, (1998).
2. “All homesteads in this state shall be assessed for taxation the same as other property, except that there shall be exempt from taxation, on any homestead described in subdivision (b) of this subsection, a percentage of the exempt amount as limited by section 77-3506.03. The exemption shall be based on the household income of a claimant pursuant to subsections (2) through (4) of this section. (b) The exemption described in subdivision (a) of this subsection shall apply to homesteads of: (i) Veterans as defined in section 80-401.01 who were discharged or otherwise separated with a characterization of honorable or general (under honorable conditions) and who are totally disabled by a non-service-connected accident or illness; (ii) Individuals who have a permanent physical

disability and have lost all mobility so as to preclude locomotion without the regular use of a mechanical aid or prostheses; and (iii) Individuals who have undergone amputation of both arms above the elbow or who have a permanent partial disability of both arms in excess of seventy-five percent.” Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-3508 (Reissue 2009).

3. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
4. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
5. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Reissue 2009).
6. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. *See, e.g., Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
7. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
8. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).

9. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Taxpayer seeks a homestead exemption based on his disability. Individuals with disabilities described in section 77-3508 may obtain a homestead exemption if they meet all of the statutory requirements. Persons may qualify for a homestead exemption under section 77-3508 if; (1) he or she is an individual who is a veteran as defined in section 80-401.01 who was discharged or otherwise separated with a characterization of honorable or general (under honorable conditions) and who is totally disabled by a non-service-connected accident or illness; (2) he or she is an individual who has a permanent physical disability who has lost all mobility so as to preclude locomotion without the regular use of a mechanical aid or prostheses; or (3) he or she is an individual who has undergone amputation of both arms above the elbow or who has a permanent disability of both arms in excess of seventy-five percent. Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-3508 (Reissue 2009). The Taxpayer is disabled but his disability is not described in section 77-3508 and he cannot be eligible for a homestead exemption.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.

3. The Taxpayer has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.
4. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining that the application of Benedict W. Lager for a homestead exemption applicable to Lot 8 Block 4 Park Manor Addition, Scottsbluff, Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska should not be approved is affirmed.
2. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Scotts Bluff County Treasurer, and the Scotts Bluff County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Reissue 2009).
3. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
4. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
5. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2011.

6. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on June 22, 2011.

Signed and Sealed. June 22, 2011.

Nancy J. Salmon, Commissioner

SEAL

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (REISSUE 2009), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.

I concur in the result.

The analysis above considers two standards of review for review. One standard of review is stated as a presumption found in case law the other is found as stated in statute. I do not believe consideration of two standards of review are required by statute or case law.

The Commission is an administrative agency of state government. *See Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital v. Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission*, 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). As an administrative agency of state government, the Commission has only the powers and authority granted to it by statute. *Id.* The Commission is authorized by statute to review appeals from decisions of a county board of equalization, the Tax Commissioner, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Reissue 2009). In general, the Commission may only grant relief on appeal if it is shown that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(8) (Reissue 2009).

The Commission is authorized to review decision of a County Board of Equalization determining taxable values. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Reissue 2009). Review of County Board

of Equalization decisions is not new in Nebraska law. As early as 1903, Nebraska Statutes provided for review of County Board assessment decisions by the district courts. Laws 1903, c. 73 §124. The statute providing for review did not state a standard for that review. *Id.* A standard of review stated as a presumption was adopted by Nebraska's Supreme Court. See, *State v. Savage*, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902) (citing *Dixon Co. v. Halstead*, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888) and *State v. County Board of Dodge Co.* 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887)). The presumption was that the County Board had faithfully performed its official duties and had acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. *See id.* In 1959, the legislature provided a statutory standard for review by the district courts of county board of equalization, assessment decisions. 1959 Neb Laws, LB 55, §3. The statutory standard of review required the District Court to affirm the decision of the county board of equalization unless the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable or the value as established was too low. *Id.* The statutory standard of review was codified in section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1511 (Cum. Supp. 1959). After adoption of the statutory standard of review, Nebraska Courts have held that the provisions of section 77-5011 of the Nebraska Statutes created a presumption that the County Board has faithfully performed its official duties and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. *See, e.g. Ideal Basic Indus. V. Nucholls Cty. Bd. Of Equal.*, 231 Neb. 297, 437 N.W.2d 501 (1989). The presumption stated by the Court was the presumption that had been found before the statute was enacted.

Many appeals of decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 were decided without reference to the statutory standard of review applicable to the district courts review of a county board of equalization's decision. *See, e.g. Grainger Brothers Company v. County Board of*

Equalization of the County of Lancaster, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966). In *Hastings Building Co., v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 190 Neb. 63, 206 N.W.2d 338 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that two standards of review existed for reviews by the district court; one statutory requiring a finding that the decision reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary, and another judicial requiring a finding that a presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully performed its official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence was overcome. No attempt was made by the *Hastings* Court to reconcile the two standards of review that were applicable to the District Courts.

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission was created in 1995. 1995 Neb. Laws, LB 490 §153. Section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes was made applicable to review of county board of equalization assessment decisions by the Commission. *Id.* In 2001, section 77-1511 of Nebraska Statutes was repealed. 2001 Neb. Laws, LB 465, §12. After repeal of section 77-1511, the standard for review to be applied by the Commission in most appeals was stated in section 77-5016 of the Nebraska Statutes. Section 77-5016(8) requires a finding that the decision being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Brenner v. Banner County Board of Equalization*, 276 Neb. 275, 753 N.W.2d 802 (2008). The Supreme Court has stated that the presumption which arose from section 77-1511 is applicable to the decisions of the Commission. *Garvey Elevators, Inc. V. Adams County Bd. of Equalization*, 261 Neb. 130, 621 N.W.2d 518 (2001).

The possible results from application of the presumption as a standard of review and the statutory standard of review are: (1) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (2) the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (3) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is overcome; (4) and finally the

presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is overcome. The first possibility does not allow a grant of relief, neither standard of review has been met. The second possibility does not therefore allow a grant of relief even though the presumption is overcome because the statutory standard remains. *See City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The third possibility requires analysis. The presumption and the statutory standard of review are different legal standards, and the statutory standard remains after the presumption has been overcome. *See id.* The burden of proof to overcome the presumption is competent evidence. *Id.* Clear and convincing evidence is required to show that a county board of equalization's decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. *See, e.g. Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002). Competent evidence that the county board of equalization failed to perform its duties or act upon sufficient competent evidence is not always evidence that the county board of equalization acted unreasonably or arbitrarily because the statutory standard of review remains even if the presumption is overcome. *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). Clear and convincing evidence that a county board of equalization's determination, action, order, or decision was unreasonable or arbitrary, as those terms have been defined, may, however, overcome the presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully discharged its duties and acted on sufficient competent evidence. In any event, the statutory standard has been met and relief may be granted. Both standards of review are met in the fourth possibility and relief may be granted.

Use of the presumption as a standard of review has been criticized. *See G. Michael Fenner, About Presumptions in Civil Cases*, 17 Creighton L. Rev. 307 (1984). In the view of that

author, the presumption should be returned to its roots as a burden of proof. *Id.* Nebraska's Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of using two standards of review and classified the presumption in favor of the county board of equalization as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *See Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). Use of the *Gordman* analysis allows consideration of both the presumption and the statutory standard of review without the difficulties inherent in the application of two standards of review. It is within that framework that I have analyzed the evidence.

Wm. R. Wickersham, Commissioner