

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

| | | |
|-------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| FRANK O. RIZZUTO, |) | |
| |) | |
| Appellant, |) | Case No. 08R 664 |
| |) | |
| v. |) | DECISION AND ORDER |
| |) | AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF |
| DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF |) | THE DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF |
| EQUALIZATION, |) | EQUALIZATION |
| |) | |
| Appellee. |) | |

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Frank O. Rizzuto ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Commission's Hearing Room on the sixth floor of the Nebraska State Office Building in the City of Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, on June 25, 2010, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued March 25, 2010. Commissioner Warnes, Vice-Chairperson of the Commission, was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Wickersham, Chairperson of the Commission, was absent. Commissioner Warnes, as Vice-Chairperson acting in the absence of the Chairperson, designated Commissioners Warnes, Salmon, and Hotz as a panel of the Commission to hear the appeal. Commissioner Hotz was excused. Commissioner Salmon was present. The appeal was heard by a quorum of a panel of the Commission.

Frank O. Rizzuto was present at the hearing. No one appeared as legal counsel for the Taxpayer.

Thomas S. Barrett, a Deputy County Attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska, was present as legal counsel for the Douglas County Board of Equalization ("the County Board").

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits, and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Reissue 2009). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

I.
ISSUES

The Taxpayer has asserted that actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2008, is less than actual value as determined by the County Board. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

The actual value of the subject property on January 1, 2008.

The Taxpayer has asserted that taxable value of the subject property as of January 1, 2008, is not equalized with the taxable value of other real property. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining the equalized taxable value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary;

Whether the equalized taxable value of the subject property was determined by the County Board in a manner and an amount that is uniform and proportionate as required by Nebraska's Constitution in Article VIII §1; and

The equalized taxable value of the subject property on January 1, 2008.

**II.
FINDINGS OF FACT**

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains ("the Subject Property") is described in the table below.
3. Actual value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2008, ("the assessment date") by the Douglas County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely protest, and actual value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

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Description: FAIRACRES ADD LOT 39 BLOCK 0 NTHLY 225.1 E 100 W 140 FT, Douglas County, Nebraska.

| | Assessor Notice Value | Taxpayer Protest Value | Board Determined Value |
|-------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Land | \$166,700.00 | \$162,000.00 | \$166,700.00 |
| Improvement | \$479,700.00 | \$311,448.00 | \$479,700.00 |
| Total | \$646,400.00 | \$473,448.00 | \$646,400.00 |

4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
5. The County Board was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
6. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on March 25, 2010, set a hearing of the appeal for June 25, 2010, at 9:00 a.m. CDST.

7. An Affidavit of Service, which appears in the records of the Commission, establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
8. Actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2008 is:

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| | |
|-------------------|----------------------|
| Land value | \$166,700.00 |
| Improvement value | <u>\$479,700.00</u> |
| Total value | <u>\$646,400.00.</u> |

III. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions necessary to determine taxable value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(7) (Reissue 2009).
2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2009).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in

section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2009).

4. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.” *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 (2002).
5. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2009).
6. All taxable real property, with the exception of agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Reissue 2009).
7. “Taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all real property and franchises as defined by the Legislature except as otherwise provided in or permitted by this Constitution.” *Neb. Const.*, Art. VIII, §1.
8. Equalization is the process of ensuring that all taxable property is placed on the assessment rolls at a uniform percentage of its actual value. *MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal.*, 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).
9. The purpose of equalization of assessments is to bring the assessment of different parts of a taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one of the parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of the tax. *MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal.*, 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991); *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999).

10. Equalization to obtain proportionate valuation requires a comparison of the ratio of assessed to actual value for the subject property and comparable property. See *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999).
11. Uniformity requires that whatever methods are used to determine actual or taxable value for various classifications of real property that the results be correlated to show uniformity. *Banner County v. State Board of Equalization*, 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 (1987).
12. Taxpayers are entitled to have their property assessed uniformly and proportionately, even though the result may be that it is assessed at less than the actual value. *Equitable Life v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equal.*, 229 Neb. 60, 425 N.W.2d 320 (1988); *Fremont Plaza v. Dodge County Bd. of Equal.*, 225 Neb. 303, 405 N.W.2d 555 (1987).
13. The constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation extends to both rate and valuation. *First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Lancaster*, 177 Neb. 390, 128 N.W.2d 820 (1964).
14. In the evaluation of real property for tax purposes, where buildings and improvements are taxable as a part of the real estate, the critical issue is the actual value of the entire property, not the proportion of that value which is allocated to the land or to the buildings and improvements by the appraiser. *Bumgarner v. Valley County*, 208 Neb. 361, 303 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
15. If taxable values are to be equalized it is necessary for a Taxpayer to establish by clear and convincing evidence that valuation placed on his or her property when compared with valuations placed on similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty, and not mere error of judgement. There must be something

more, something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity. *Newman v. County of Dawson*, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959).

16. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
17. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization, fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes, is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
18. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
19. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
20. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
21. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).

22. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).
23. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).
24. "An owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth is permitted to testify as to its value." *U. S. Ecology v. Boyd County Bd. Of Equalization*, 256 Neb. 7, 16, 588 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1999).
25. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the taxpayer establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 580 N.W.2d 561 (1998).
26. A Taxpayer, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by the county assessor, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).
27. A Taxpayer must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. Cf. *Lincoln Tel. and Tel. Co. v. County Bd. Of Equalization of York County*, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981); *Arenson v. Cedar County*, 212 Neb. 62, 321 N.W.2d 427 (1982) (determination of equalized

taxable value) *Josten-Wilbert Vault Co. v. Board of Equalization for Buffalo County*, 179 Neb. 415, 138 N.W.2d 641 (1965) (determination of actual value).

IV. ANALYSIS

The subject property is a residential parcel improved with a raised ranch style house with 3,308 square feet living area built in 1962. (E4:3). The house is rated very good for quality and good for condition. (E4:3).

The Taxpayer has asserted that actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2008, is less than actual value as determined by the County Board. In addition, the Taxpayer has asserted that taxable value of the subject property as of January 1, 2008, is not equalized with the taxable value of other real property.

The Taxpayer testified that he derived a valuation for the land of the subject property, \$162,000, by using \$7 per square foot (23,156 square feet x \$7/square foot = \$162,000). His testimony was that the basis of this opinion was from something he had heard or read about the valuation of his land some four years earlier. He testified that the County had used \$7.20 per square foot to value the land for 2008 and he alleged that a lower figure of \$7 per square foot should be used because of the negative effect of the traffic on the adjacent Underwood street. The Commission finds that there is not evidence to support the Taxpayer's opinion of the value of the land component of the subject property and gives this opinion little weight for probative value. The Commission further finds that there is no evidence by the Taxpayer to quantify any negative effect that the nearby roadway would have on the actual value of the subject property.

The Taxpayer testified that the comparables offered by the County and shown on Exhibit 2 page 11 were 1 1/2 to 2 stories. He testified that he believed that his three alleged comparable parcels were more comparable to the subject property because they were of the same style of house as the subject property, "raised ranch". (E4:3). This allegation would be valid if the County used their alleged comparables to value the subject property, but the Commission notes that there are no adjustments made to the County's comparables in order to compare them to the subject property. Instead, the Commission notes that the County appears to have valued the subject property using a sales comparison approach as explained in Exhibit 2 page 9 and detailed on Exhibit 4 page 7.

The Taxpayer testified that he compared the square foot value of the land and improvements for the subject property to the same square foot valuation of the three alleged comparable parcels. (E4:1). The only variables that the Taxpayer took into consideration in making this comparison were the land and the total valuation of the improvements. The Commission finds that this is not a valid appraisal method of valuation for the following reasons.

First, the Taxpayer has not taken into account differences between the subject property and his three comparable parcels. Secondly, the Taxpayer has taken an average to derive an opinion of actual value which is not an accepted appraisal practice.

The subject property and the three alleged comparable parcels are shown as follows.

Subject property - Exhibit 4, pages 2 to 8

Comparable #1 - Exhibit 4, pages 9 to 14

Comparable #2 - Exhibit 4, pages 15 to 20

Comparable #3 - Exhibit 4, pages 21 to 27

The Commission finds that the three alleged comparable parcels are not comparable to the subject property and cannot be compared to the subject property without making adjustments for differences. Examples of some of the differences between the subject property and the three alleged comparable parcels include the rating of "quality" with the subject property being rated "very good", but comparables rated from average (comparable #3) to good (comparable #1). Other examples of differences noted by the Commission include the area of finished basement with the subject property having 1,000 square feet and comparable #1 - 2,000 square feet, comparable #2 - 900 square feet, and comparable #3 - no finished basement.

“Comparable properties” share similar quality, architectural attractiveness (style), age, size, amenities, functional utility, and physical condition. *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2nd Ed., International Association of Assessing Officers, 1996, 98.

When using “comparables” to determine value, similarities and differences between the subject property and the comparables must be recognized. *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2nd Ed., 1996, 103. Most adjustments are for physical characteristics. *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2nd Ed., 1996, 105. “Financing terms, market conditions, location, and physical characteristics are items that must be considered when making adjustments . . .” *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2nd Ed., 1996, 98.

“Equalization is the process of ensuring that all taxable property is placed on the assessment rolls at a uniform percentage of its actual value. The purpose of equalization of assessments is to bring assessments from different parts of the taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one part is compelled to pay a disproportionate share of the tax. Where it is impossible to secure both the standards of the true value of a property for taxation and the uniformity and equality

required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law. If a taxpayer's property is assessed in excess of the value at which others are taxed, then the taxpayer has a right to relief. However, the burden is on the taxpayer to show by clear and convincing evidence that the valuation placed upon the taxpayer's property when compared with valuation placed on other similar property is grossly excessive.” *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597, 597 N.W.2d 623, 635 (1999).

The Taxpayer has not rebutted the presumption that the County Board had faithfully performed its duties and had sufficient competent evidence for its determination and has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board was arbitrary or unreasonable. Further, there is not clear and convincing evidence that the difference between what the subject property was valued when compared with other similar property is grossly excessive, nor that the discrepancy was not the result of an error of judgment but was a deliberate and intentional discrimination systematically applied.

The Commission finds that the appeal of the Taxpayer should be denied.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.

4. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2008, is affirmed.
2. Actual value, for the tax year 2008, of the subject property is:

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Land value \$166,700.00

Improvement value \$479,700.00

Total value \$646,400.00.

3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Douglas County Treasurer, and the Douglas County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Reissue 2009).
4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2008.

7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on July 21, 2010.

Nancy J. Salmon, Commissioner

William C. Warnes, Commissioner

SEAL

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (REISSUE 2009), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.