

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

STEVEN W. FLOERSCH,)	
)	
Appellant,)	Case No. 07R-921
)	
v.)	DECISION AND ORDER
)	AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF)	THE DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,)	EQUALIZATION
)	
Appellee.)	

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Steven W. Floersch ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). Hearings were held in the Commission's Hearing Room on the sixth floor of the Nebraska State Office Building in the City of Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, on April 2, and July 16, 2009, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued February 4, 2009, and as amended by an Order dated June 30, 2009. The hearing was recessed after the hearing of April 2, 2009, in order to obtain additional evidence of the Taxpayer's filing of a Form 422 or its equivalent. A telephonic hearing occurred on July 16, 2009, for this purpose and the receipt of additional evidence requested by the Commission. Commissioners Warnes and Hotz were present. Commissioner Warnes was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Wickersham was excused from participation by the presiding hearing officer. A panel of three commissioners was created pursuant to 442 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 4, §011 (10/07). Commissioner Salmon was absent. The appeal was heard by a quorum of a panel of the Commission.

Steven W. Floersch was present at the hearing. No one appeared as legal counsel for the Taxpayer.

Thomas S. Barrett, a Deputy County Attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska, was present as legal counsel for the Douglas County Board of Equalization (“the County Board”).

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits, and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2008). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

I. ISSUES

The Taxpayer has asserted that actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, is less than actual value as determined by the County Board. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

The actual value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.

The Taxpayer has asserted that taxable value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, is not equalized with the taxable value of other real property. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining the equalized taxable value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary;

Whether the equalized taxable value of the subject property was determined by the County Board in a manner and an amount that is uniform and proportionate as required by Nebraska’s Constitution in Article VIII §1; and

The equalized taxable value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.

**II.
FINDINGS OF FACT**

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains ("the Subject Property") is described in the table below.
3. Actual value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2007, ("the assessment date") by the Douglas County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely protest, and actual value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

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Description: PRAIRIE LANE LOT 9 BLOCK 17 IRREG, Douglas County, Nebraska.

	Assessor Notice Value	Taxpayer Protest Value	Board Determined Value
Land	\$13,100.00	Included in Total	\$13,100.00
Improvement	\$193,000.00	Included in Total	\$193,000.00
Total	\$206,100.00	\$165,000.00	\$206,100.00

4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.

5. The County Board was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
6. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on February 4, 2009, as amended by an Order issued on June 30, 2009, set a hearing of the appeal for July 16, 2009, at 9:00 a.m. CDST.
7. An Affidavit of Service which appears in the records of the Commission establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
8. Actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2007 is:

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Land value	\$ 13,100.00
Improvement value	<u>\$193,000.00</u>
Total value	<u>\$206,100.00.</u>

III. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions necessary to determine taxable value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(7) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis

- shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
 4. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.”
Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al., 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 (2002).
 5. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2003).
 6. All taxable real property, with the exception of agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
 7. “Taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all real property and franchises as defined by the Legislature except as otherwise provided in or permitted by this Constitution.” *Neb. Const.*, Art. VIII, §1.
 8. Equalization is the process of ensuring that all taxable property is placed on the assessment rolls at a uniform percentage of its actual value. *MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal.*, 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).

9. The purpose of equalization of assessments is to bring the assessment of different parts of a taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one of the parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of the tax. *MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal.*, 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991); *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999).
10. Equalization to obtain proportionate valuation requires a comparison of the ratio of assessed to actual value for the subject property and comparable property. See, *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999).
11. Uniformity requires that whatever methods are used to determine actual or taxable value for various classifications of real property that the results be correlated to show uniformity. *Banner County v. State Board of Equalization*, 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 (1987).
12. Taxpayers are entitled to have their property assessed uniformly and proportionately, even though the result may be that it is assessed at less than the actual value. *Equitable Life v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equal.*, 229 Neb. 60, 425 N.W.2d 320 (1988); *Fremont Plaza v. Dodge County Bd. of Equal.*, 225 Neb. 303, 405 N.W.2d 555 (1987).
13. The constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation extends to both rate and valuation. *First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Lancaster*, 177 Neb. 390, 128 N.W.2d 820 (1964).
14. In the evaluation of real property for tax purposes, where buildings and improvements are taxable as a part of the real estate, the critical issue is the actual value of the entire property, not the proportion of that value which is allocated to the land or to the buildings

- and improvements by the appraiser. *Bumgarner v. Valley County*, 208 Neb. 361, 303 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
15. If taxable values are to be equalized it is necessary for a Taxpayer to establish by clear and convincing evidence that valuation placed on his or her property when compared with valuations placed on similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty, and not mere error of judgement. There must be something more, something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity. *Newman v. County of Dawson*, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959).
 16. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
 17. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
 18. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
 19. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2006).

20. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
21. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
22. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).
23. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).
24. "An owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth is permitted to testify as to its value." *U. S. Ecology v. Boyd County Bd. Of Equalization*, 256 Neb. 7, 16, 588 N.W.2d 575, 581, (1999).
25. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the taxpayer establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 580 N.W.2d 561 (1998).
26. A Taxpayer, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by the county assessor, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon

property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).

27. A Taxpayer must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. Cf. *Lincoln Tel. and Tel. Co. v. County Bd. Of Equalization of York County*, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981); *Arenson v. Cedar County*, 212 Neb. 62, 321 N.W.2d 427 (1982) (determination of equalized taxable value) *Josten-Wilbert Vault Co. v. Board of Equalization for Buffalo County*, 179 Neb. 415, 138 N.W.2d 641 (1965) (determination of actual value).

IV. ANALYSIS

The subject property is an improved residential parcel with a multi-level house built in 1964 that has 1,802 square feet of finished living area and is rated average for both quality and condition. (E2:2 and E3:1).

The Taxpayer provided as evidence in support of his valuation and equalization appeal two parcels which he alleges are comparable to the subject property. The two properties both had sold and the Taxpayer is comparing the valuation per square foot of the sold parcels to the valuation per square foot of the assessed valuation of the subject property.

The first parcel alleged to be comparable to the subject property is located directly next door to the south. Exhibit 6 page 1 is a map showing the subject property, #1, and the other two parcels, #2 and #3. The Taxpayer confirmed that all three parcels are in close proximity to each other.

The Taxpayer provided Exhibit 6, pages 5-7, regarding his #2 alleged comparable, however, it was not admitted into evidence since an objection was sustained of the Taxpayer's failure to timely provide said evidence. The Taxpayer testified as to his personal knowledge of this parcel which is located at 2362 S. 114th Avenue.

Parcel #3 is located at 3371 S. 114 th Avenue. The Taxpayer did not provide the property record files for parcel #3, but instead provided as evidence "screen shots" from the Douglas County website. The Commission's Order for Hearing, paragraph #13, specifically required the production of the property record file for any parcels which would be used as comparables to the subject property. The Commission's Order for Hearing cautions Taxpayers from using "screen shots" from websites since they are incomplete in the information they provide.

The table below shows that information which was provided by the Taxpayer for the subject property and the two alleged comparables.

	Subject Property	Comparable #1	Comparable #2
Street Address	3354 S. 114 Ave.	3362 S. 114 Ave.	3371 S. 114 Ave.
Date of Sale		January 29, 2008	July 18, 2007
Sale Price		\$168,000	\$174,000
Living Area (SF)	1,802	1,728	1,620
\$/SF Living Area		\$97.22	\$107.40
Basement Area (SF)	1,714	1,600	1,326
Finished BasementSF	900	800	570

From the table above the Commission can see that there is a wide range in physical attributes between the subject property and the alleged comparables. Without the property record

files for the alleged comparable parcels, the Commission is not able to make a proper comparison between the subject property and the alleged comparables.

The Commission gives less weight to comparable #1 since its sales date is some 13 months past January 1, 2007, the effective date of the County Assessor's valuation date. Comparable #2 is significantly smaller in living area, 1,620 square feet versus 1,802 square feet. Similarly, the total basement area and finished basement area of comparable #2 are substantially smaller than the subject property. All of the differences in physical attributes would have to be taken into account and adjustments made to make a comparison between the subject property and the alleged comparable #2. Without the property record files, the cost detail calculation sheet is not available to assist with such a comparison to see how the County valued each parcel.

The County Board also provided comparable properties in Exhibits 2, 3, and 4. The land component of the subject property was valued at \$13,100. (Exhibit 3, page 2). Since the square footage of the land is listed as 11,640, we can conclude that the land was valued at \$1.13 per square foot ($\$13,100/11,640$). However, the comparable property at Exhibit 4, page 7 appears to have been valued at \$1.07 per square foot ($\$13,300/12,408$). Had the subject property been valued uniformly with this comparable it would have reduced the land value of the subject property to \$12,455 ($11,640 \times \1.07) and the total value of the subject parcel to \$205,455 rather than \$206,100. The Commission heard no explanation as to why the land component for the properties were not valued at the same per foot amount. If taxable values are to be equalized it is necessary for a Taxpayer to establish by clear and convincing evidence that valuation placed on his or her property when compared with valuations placed on similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty, and not mere error of

judgement. *Newman v. County of Dawson*, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959). Based upon the evidence received, we find that the difference in the valuation of the land is not grossly excessive nor is the difference in the valuation the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty.

A taxpayer who offers no evidence that the subject property is valued in excess of its actual value and who only produces evidence that is aimed at discrediting the valuation methods utilized by county assessor fails to meet his or her burden of proving that the value of the property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon the property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).

"There is a presumption that a board of equalization has faithfully performed its official duties in making an assessment and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its action. That presumption remains until there is competent evidence to the contrary presented, and the presumption disappears when there is competent evidence adduced on appeal to the contrary. From that point forward, the reasonableness of the valuation fixed by the board of equalization becomes one of fact based upon all the evidence presented. The burden of showing such valuation to be unreasonable rests upon the taxpayer on appeal from the action of the board. *DeBruce Grain, Inc. v. Otoe County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 688, 696, 584 N.W.2d 837, 842 - 843 (1998).

The Commission finds that the Taxpayer has not rebutted the presumption and has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the County Board of Equalization's determination of value was arbitrary or unreasonable. The appeal of the Taxpayer is denied.

**V.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.
4. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2007, is affirmed.
2. Actual value, for the tax year 2007, of the subject property is:

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Land value \$ 13,100.00

Improvement value \$193,000.00

Total value \$206,100.00.

3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Douglas County Treasurer, and the Douglas County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2007.
7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on September 4, 2009.

Signed and Sealed. September 4, 2009.

Robert W. Hotz, Commissioner

William C. Warnes, Commissioner

SEAL

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (CUM. SUPP. 2006), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.