

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

EL CHARMAN LANDOWNER'S CORP,)	
)	
Appellant,)	Case No. 07C-068
)	
v.)	DECISION AND ORDER
)	AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
KEARNEY COUNTY BOARD OF)	THE KEARNEY COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,)	EQUALIZATION
)	
Appellee.)	

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by El Charman Landowner's Corp ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Holiday Inn Express, 508 2nd Ave. Kearney, Nebraska, on November 4, 2008, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued September 5, 2008. Commissioners Wickersham, Warnes, and Salmon were present. Commissioner Wickersham was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Hotz was excused from participation by the presiding hearing officer. The appeal was heard by a panel of three commissioners pursuant to 442 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 4, §011 (10/07).

Edward C. Berglund, Treasurer of El Charman Landowner's Corp, was present at the hearing with Andrew D. Romatzke as legal counsel.

David G. Wondra, County Attorney for Kearney County, Nebraska, was present as legal counsel for the Kearney County Board of Equalization ("the County Board").

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-

5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

**I.
ISSUES**

The Taxpayer has asserted that actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, is less than actual value as determined by the County Board. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

The actual value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.

The Taxpayer has asserted that taxable value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, is not equalized with the taxable value of other real property. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining the equalized taxable value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary;

Whether the equalized taxable value of the subject property was determined by the County Board in a manner and an amount that is uniform and proportionate as required by Nebraska's Constitution in Article VIII §1; and

The equalized taxable value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.

**II.
FINDINGS OF FACT**

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains ("the Subject Property") is described in the table below.
3. Actual value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2007, ("the assessment date") by the Kearney County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely protest, and actual value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

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Description: Lots 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, East 26.98 feet Lot F, Field Lot 1, Lake Lots 1 & 2, Access Areas, and Parklands, El Charman Lake Addition, Kearney County, Nebraska.

	Assessor Notice Value	Taxpayer Protest Value	Board Determined Value
Land	\$655,510.00	\$87,985.00	\$414,775.00
Improvement	\$7,150.00	\$7,150.00	\$7,150.00
Total	\$662,660.00	\$95,135.00	\$421,925.00

4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
5. The County Board was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
6. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on September 5, 2008, set a hearing of the appeal for November 4, 2008, at 10:00 a.m. CST.
7. An Affidavit of Service which appears in the records of the Commission establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
8. Actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2007 is:

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Land value	\$414,775.00
Improvement value	<u>\$ 7,150.00</u>
Total value	<u>\$421,925.00.</u>

**III.
APPLICABLE LAW**

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions necessary to determine taxable value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(7) (Supp. 2007).
2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
4. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.”
Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al., 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 (2002).

5. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2003).
6. All taxable real property, with the exception of agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
7. “Taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all real property and franchises as defined by the Legislature except as otherwise provided in or permitted by this Constitution.” *Neb. Const.*, Art. VIII, §1.
8. Equalization to obtain proportionate valuation requires a comparison of the ratio of assessed to actual value for the subject property and comparable property. *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999).
9. Uniformity requires that whatever methods are used to determine actual or taxable value for various classifications of real property that the results be correlated to show uniformity. *Banner County v. State Board of Equalization*, 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 (1987).
10. Taxpayers are entitled to have their property assessed uniformly and proportionately, even though the result may be that it is assessed at less than the actual value. *Equitable Life v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equal.*, 229 Neb. 60, 425 N.W.2d 320 (1988); *Fremont Plaza v. Dodge County Bd. of Equal.*, 225 Neb. 303, 405 N.W.2d 555 (1987).

11. The constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation extends to both rate and valuation. *First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Lancaster*, 177 Neb. 390, 128 N.W.2d 820 (1964).
12. In the evaluation of real property for tax purposes, where buildings and improvements are taxable as a part of the real estate, the critical issue is the actual value of the entire property, not the proportion of that value which is allocated to the land or to the buildings and improvements by the appraiser. *Bumgarner v. Valley County*, 208 Neb. 361, 303 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
13. If taxable values are to be equalized it is necessary for a Taxpayer to establish by clear and convincing evidence that valuation placed on his or her property when compared with valuations placed on similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty, and not mere error of judgement. There must be something more, something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity. *Newman v. County of Dawson*, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959).
14. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
15. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions

- governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
16. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
 17. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
 18. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
 19. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
 20. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).
 21. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).
 22. A corporate officer or other representative of an entity, must be shown to be familiar with the property in question and have a knowledge of values generally in the vicinity to be qualified to offer an opinion of value. *Kohl's Dept. Stores v. Douglas County Bd. of Equal.*, 10 Neb.App. 809, 638 N.W.2d, 881 (2002).

23. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the taxpayer establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 580 N.W.2d 561 (1998).
24. A Taxpayer, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by the county assessor, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).
25. A Taxpayer must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. Cf. *Lincoln Tel. and Tel. Co. v. County Bd. Of Equalization of York County*, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981); *Arenson v. Cedar County*, 212 Neb. 62, 321 N.W.2d 427 (1982) (determination of equalized values); and *Josten-Wilbert Vault Co. v. Board of Equalization for Buffalo County*, 179 Neb. 415, 138 N.W.2d 641 (1965) (determination of actual value).

IV. ANALYSIS

The subject property as described by the Taxpayer's Treasurer consists of tracts with varying characteristics. Lots 19, 20 and 21 lie on the North side of El Charman Lake. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that the lots could not be developed for residential use. Lot 24 lies on the Southwest corner of El Charman Lake. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that Lot 24 could not be developed for residential use. Lots 25, 26, 27, AND 28 abuts Lake Lot 2. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that perhaps two lots out of the four could be developed for

residential use. The East 26.98 feet of Lot F abuts El Charman Lake. (E3). Field Lot 1 is a large lot on the South side of El Charman Lake. (E3). Field Lot 1 is separated from the Lake by an access road. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that part of the lot is used as a leach field for septic tanks and that part of the lot is hayed. Lake Lot 1 is assumed to encompass El Charman Lake as shown in Exhibit 3. Lake Lot 2 contains a small lake separate from El Charman Lake. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that the small lake was used for fishing. Common Access Lot 1 lies at the Northwest edge of El Charman Lake between Lots 21 and 22. (E3). Common Access Lot 1 lies on the South side of El Charman Lake between Lots N and O. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that one common access area was used for boat ramps to allow placement and removal of boats from the lake. Park Lands Lot 1 is at the Northeast corner of the subject property. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that the area is used for picnicking and other recreation. Parks Lands Lots 2 & 3 are at the Southeast corner of the subject property. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that the open area between the two lots had been filled with material dredged from the lake and was unstable. Park Lands Lot 4 forms a point at the ends of lots R & S on the South side of El Charman Lake. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that the lot cannot be developed for residential use. Park Lands Lot 5 lies across an access road in the Southeast part of the subject property. (E3). The Taxpayer's Treasurer testified that the lot is used for storage of boats. The shed on the lot is used for equipment. The subject property contains 1,732,450 square feet. (E8). That is 39.77 acres ($1,732,450 \div 43,560 = 39.77$).

It is only the equalized taxable value of the subject property that is at issue in this appeal. If taxable values are to be equalized it is necessary for a Taxpayer to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that valuation placed on his or her property when compared with valuations placed on similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of systematic will or failure of a plain legal duty, and not mere error of judgement. There must be something more, something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity. *Newman v. County of Dawson*, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959). Equalization is the process of ensuring that all taxable property is placed on the assessment rolls at a uniform percentage of its actual value. The purpose of equalization of assessments is to bring assessments from different parts of the taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one part is compelled to pay a disproportionate share of the tax. *Cabela's Inc. v. Cheyenne County Bd. of Equalization*, 8 Neb.App. 582, 597 N.W.2d 623 (1999). The Taxpayer is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the valuation placed upon the taxpayer's property when compared with valuation placed on other similar property is grossly excessive. *Id.*

An appraiser for the Taxpayer ("Taxpayer's Appraiser") testified that in his opinion equalized taxable value of the subject property for tax year 2007 was \$32,596.00 The Taxpayer's Appraiser based his opinion on an analysis shown in Exhibit 3. Development of the analysis was a multi-step process. First the Taxpayer's Appraiser made an assumption that three parcels valued and taxed independently by the Kearney County Assessor should be combined for purposes of his analysis. (E2:3). The combined parcels are identified as comparables 1, 2, and 3 in Exhibit 3. (E2:3). Comparables #1 and #2 are described as lakes at Brandt's Lakewood. E3:2). Aerial photographs of Comparables #1 and #2 are provided. (E2:26 and 17). Comparable #3 is described as an 24,936 square foot lot. (E2:3). An aerial photograph labeled Comparable #3 was provided. (E2:17). The property record files for comparables #1,2,and 3

were not provided as required by the Commission's order for hearing leaving some uncertainty about the characteristics of the parcels.

In the next step of the process the Taxpayer's Appraiser identified a sale of land in Buffalo County that he deemed comparable to the combined Brant's Lakewood parcels. The parcel is identified as a 13.5 acre parcel that is lake land only. (E2:4). The Taxpayer's Appraiser testified that the parties to the sale were the developer of the lake as seller and a homeowner's association as the buyer. The Taxpayer's Appraiser testified that prior to the sale the seller collected fees from the homeowner's for their use of the lake and was responsible for management of the lake. A dispute arose between the homeowners and the developer over management of the lake. The dispute was resolved by the sale. For purposes of further analysis it is necessary to assume that the sale by the developer to the homeowners was for actual value of the lake. Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm's length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003). Sale of a parcel may indicate its actual value but it is necessary to examine the circumstances of the sale. See, *Potts v. Board of Equalization of Hamilton County*, 213 Neb. 37, 48, 328 N.W.2d 175, 328 (1982). The buyer and seller in the transaction were each willing to settle a dispute through the transfer of real estate. The sale of a lake by a developer to homeowner's adjoining the lake to settle a dispute is not an indication of the actual value of the lake.

A further difficulty with the analysis presented by the Taxpayer's Appraiser is the assertion that the lake land sold in Buffalo County is comparable to the 3 combined parcels at Brandt' Lakewood in Kearney County. The sale in Buffalo County was of lake land only. The 3 Brandt's Lakewood parcels includes 24,936 square feet of undeveloped land at one of the lakes. (2:3). The Taxpayer's Appraiser indicated that the market value of lake land is different than undeveloped land outside of a lake. (E2:4). No rationale was presented for assuming that the value of lake land and undeveloped land together is indicated by the sale of lake land.

Finally, the Taxpayer's Appraiser concluded that the ratio of actual value for the Brandt's Lakewood combined parcels, as indicated by the Buffalo County sale of lake land, to the taxable value of those parcels, was appropriate to determine an equalization ratio to be applied to taxable value of the subject property. (E2:5). At a minimum the parcels compared for equalization purposes must be similar. *Newman v. County of Dawson*, 167 Neb. 666, 94 N.W.2d 47 (1959). The subject property consists of 37.99 acres of mixed lake and lake front land. The lands composing the subject property are used for a variety of purposes. One tract is used for the production of hay. Even if the combination of parcels is permissible, the combined parcels at Brandt's Lakewood are not similar to the subject property. An equalization claim cannot be made based on the comparison suggested by the Taxpayer's Appraiser.

The evidence does not support the Taxpayer's equalization claim and relief is denied.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.

2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.
4. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2007, is affirmed.
2. Actual value, for the tax year 2007, of the subject property is:

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Land value \$414,775.00

Improvement value \$ 7,150.00

Total value \$421,925.00.

3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Kearney County Treasurer, and the Kearney County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.

5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2007.
7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on November 25, 2008.

Signed and Sealed. November 25, 2008.

Nancy J. Salmon, Commissioner

William C. Warnes, Commissioner

SEAL

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (CUM. SUPP. 2006), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.

I concur in the result.

The Commission is an administrative agency of state government. See, *Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital v. Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission*, 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). As an administrative agency of state government the Commission has only the powers and authority granted to it by statute. *Id.* The Commission is authorized by statute to review appeals from decisions of a county board of equalization, the Tax Commissioner, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). In general the Commission may only grant relief on appeal if it is shown that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(8) (Supp. 2007).

Nebraska courts have held that the provisions of section 77-5016(8) of the Nebraska Statutes create a presumption that the County Board has faithfully performed its official duties

and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. *City of York v. York County Board of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The presumption cited in *York* has roots in the early jurisprudence of Nebraska. See, *State v. Savage*, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902) (citing *Dixon Co. v. Halstead*, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888) and *State v. County Board of Dodge Co.* 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887)). As early as 1903 Nebraska Statutes provided for review of County Board assessment decisions by the district courts. Laws 1903, c. 73 §124. The statute providing for review did not state a standard for that review. *Id.*

In 1959 the legislature provided a statutory standard for review by the district courts of county board of equalization, assessment decisions. 1959 Neb Laws, LB 55, §3. The statutory standard of review required the district Court to affirm the decision of the county board of equalization unless the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable or the value as established was too low. *Id.* The statutory standard of review was codified in section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1511 (Cum. Supp. 1959). Review of district court decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 was de novo. *Future Motels, Inc. v. Custer County Board of Equalization*, 252 Neb. 565, 563 N.W.2d 785 (1997). The presumption functioned as a standard of review. See, e.g. *Gamboni v. County of Otoe*, 159 Neb. 417, 67 N.W.2d 492 (1954).

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission was created in 1995. 1995 Neb. Laws, LB 490 §153. Section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes was made applicable to review of county board of equalization assessment decisions by the Commission. *Id.* In 2001 section 77-1511 of Nebraska Statutes was repealed. 2001 Neb. Laws, LB 465, §12. After repeal of section 77-1511 the standard for review to be applied by the Commission in most appeals was stated in section 77-5016 of the Nebraska Statutes. Section 77-5016 requires a finding that the decision

being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. The basis for that determination is the evidence presented to the Commission in a new record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (Cum. Supp. 2006). Commission decisions are reviewed for error on the record. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5019(5) (Cum. Supp. 2006). The statutory basis for Commission review and the review of its decisions is analogous to district courts review of decisions made by administrative agencies. The basis for district court review of decisions made by administrative agencies is de novo on the record. *Tyson Fresh Meats v. State*, 270 Neb. 535, 704 N.W.2d 788 (2005). The decisions of the district court examining the administrative decision are reviewed for error on the record. *Thorson v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs.*, 274 Neb. 322, 740 N.W.2d 27 (2007). The similarities are enough to suggest that the framework for review applied to district court decisions could be made applicable to decisions of the Commission.

Many appeals of decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 were decided without reference to the statutory standard of review applicable to the district courts. See, e.g. *Grainger Brothers Company v. County Board of Equalization of the County of Lancaster*, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966). As noted however review was de novo and the reviewing court was not bound by the standard of review imposed on district court. *Loskill v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 186 Neb. 707, 185 N.W.2d 852 (1971). In *Hastings Building Co., v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 190 Neb. 63, 206 N.W.2d 338 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that two standards of review existed for the district courts; one statutory, and the other judicial stated as a presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully performed its official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence. No attempt was

made by the *Hastings* Court to reconcile the two standards of review that were applicable to the district courts.

The possible results from application of the presumption and the statutory standard of review by the Commission are: (1) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (2) the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (3) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is overcome; (4) and finally the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is overcome. The first possibility does not allow a grant of relief, neither standard of review has been met. If the presumption is overcome the statutory standard remains. See, *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The second possibility does not therefore allow a grant of relief even though the presumption is overcome. The third possibility requires analysis. The presumption and the statutory standard of review are different legal standards, one remaining after the other has been met. See. *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The burden of proof to overcome the presumption is competent evidence. *City of York*, Supra. Clear and convincing evidence is required to show that a county board of equalization's decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002). Competent evidence that the county board of equalization failed to perform its duties or act upon sufficient competent evidence is not always evidence that the county board of equalization acted unreasonably or arbitrarily because the statutory standard of review remains even if the presumption is overcome. *City of York*, Supra. Clear and convincing evidence that a county board of equalization's determination, action, order, or decision was unreasonable or arbitrary, as those terms have been defined, may however

overcome the presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully discharged its duties and acted on sufficient competent evidence. In any event the statutory standard has been met and relief may be granted. Both standards of review are met in the fourth possibility and relief may be granted. Each analyses of the standards of review allowing a grant of relief requires a finding that the statutory standard has been met.

Use of the presumption as a standard of review has been criticized. See, G. Michael Fenner, *About Presumptions in Civil Cases*, 17 *Creighton L. Rev.* 307 (1984). In the view of that author the presumption should be returned to its roots as a burden of proof. *Id.* Nebraska's Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of using two standards of review and classified the presumption in favor of the county board of equalization as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. See, *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). Use of the *Gordman* analysis allows consideration of both the presumption and the statutory standard of review without the possible conflict or difficulties inherent in the application of two standards of review. The *Gordman* analysis requires the Commission to consider all of the evidence produced in order to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the decision, action, order, or determination being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. It is within that framework that I have analyzed the evidence.

Wm R. Wickersham, Commissioner