

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

ALLYN L. WIEBELHAUS,)	
)	
Appellant,)	Case No 06R-065
)	
v.)	DECISION AND ORDER AFFIRMING
)	THE DECISION OF THE DOUGLAS
DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF)	COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
EQUALIZATION,)	
)	
Appellee.)	

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Allyn L. Wiebelhaus ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Commission's Hearing Room on the sixth floor of the Nebraska State Office Building in the City of Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, on September 6, 2007, pursuant to recess from a hearing begun July 31, 2006 as provided in an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued April 5, 2007. Commissioners Wickersham, Warnes, Salmon, and Hotz were present. Commissioner Wickersham presided at the hearing.

Allyn L. Wiebelhaus, was present at the hearing. Jason C. Demman appeared as legal counsel for the Taxpayer.

Thomas S. Barrett, a Deputy County Attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska, appeared as legal counsel for the Douglas County Board of Equalization ("the County Board").

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits and heard testimony.

The Commission is required by Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006) to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

**I.
ISSUES**

The Taxpayer has asserted that actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2006, is less than actual value as determined by the County Board. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

The actual value of the subject property on January 1, 2006.

**II.
FINDINGS OF FACT**

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains is described as Lot 107 Block O, Bryn Mawr, Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska, ("the subject property").
3. Actual value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2006, ("the assessment date") by the Douglas County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely protest, and actual value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

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Description: Lot 107 Block O, Bryn Mawr, Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska.

	Assessor Notice Value	Taxpayer Protest Value	Board Determined Value
Land	\$ 30,600.00	\$ 30,600.00	\$ 30,600.00
Improvement	\$330,200.00	\$235,000.00	\$330,200.00
Total	\$360,800.00	\$265,600.00	\$360,800.00

4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
5. The County Board was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
6. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on April 5, 2007, set a hearing of the appeal for July 31, 2006 at 1:00 p.m. CDST.
7. An Affidavit of Service which appears in the records of the Commission establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
8. The hearing commenced on July 31 was recessed until September 6, 2007 at 1:00 p.m..
9. Actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2006 is:

Land value	\$ 30,600.00
Improvement value	<u>\$330,200.00</u>
Total value	<u>\$360,800.00.</u>

**III.
APPLICABLE LAW**

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over issues raised during the county board of equalization proceedings. *Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 655, 584 N.W.2d 353, (1998).

2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
4. Use of all of the statutory factors for determination of actual value is not required. All that is required is use of the applicable factors. *First National Bank & Trust of Syracuse v. Otoe Cty.*, 233 Neb. 412, 445 N.W.2d 880 (1989).
5. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.” *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 (2002).
6. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2003).

7. All taxable real property, with the exception of qualified agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
8. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
9. The presumption that a county board of equalization has faithfully performed its official duties in making an assessment and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its action remains until there is competent evidence to the contrary presented, and the presumption disappears when there is competent evidence adduced on appeal to the contrary. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
10. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987) (citations omitted)
11. The Commission can grant relief only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the action of the County Board was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2006), and e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).

12. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
13. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736, (2000).
14. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447, (1999).
15. "An owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth is permitted to testify as to its value." *U. S. Ecology v. Boyd County Bd. Of Equalization*, 256 Neb. 7, 16, 588 N.W.2d 575, 581, (1999).
16. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the taxpayer establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 168, 580 N.W.2d 561, 566 (1998).
17. A Taxpayer, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by county assessor, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).

18. Taxpayer must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. *Lincoln Tel. and Tel. Co. v. County Bd. Of Equalization of York County*, 209 Neb. 465, 308 N.W.2d 515 (1981).

IV. ANALYSIS

The subject property is an improved residential parcel. The residence built in 1987, is a ranch style home with 2,445 square feet on the ground floor, 1700 square feet of finished basement and a 756 square foot attached garage. (E13:1).

The Taxpayer testified that actual value of the residence as of January 1, 2006 was between \$317,000 and \$320,000. The Taxpayer based his opinion on an analysis of the assessed values of four parcels described in Exhibit 2. The Taxpayer contends that the actual or fair market value of the subject property should be determined based on the taxable or “assessed” value per square foot of the other parcels. A Taxpayer wishing to use taxable “assessed” values to prove actual or fair market value must show that the approach is a professionally approved mass or fee appraisal approach and application of the approach.

A determination of actual value may be made for mass appraisal and assessment purposes by using approaches identified in Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003). The approaches identified are the sales comparison approach, the income approach, the cost approach and other professionally accepted mass appraisal methods. *Id.* Comparison of assessed values is not identified in the Nebraska Statutes as an accepted approach for a determination of actual value for purposes of mass appraisal. *Id.* Because the

method is not identified in statute, proof of its professional acceptance as an appraisal approach would have to be produced. *Id.* No evidence has been presented to the Commission that comparison of assessed values is a professionally accepted mass or fee appraisal approach. The Taxpayer in this case asks the Commission to presume that the taxable “assessed” value of each offered comparable is equal to its actual value. A presumption can arise that an assessor properly determined taxable value. *Woods v. Lincoln Gas and Electric Co.*, 74 Neb. 526, 527 (1905), *Brown v. Douglas County*, 98 Neb. 299, 303 (1915), *Gamboni v. County of Otoe*, 159 Neb. 417, 431, 67 N.W.2d 489, 499 (1954), *Ahern v. Board of Equalization*, 160 Neb. 709, 711, 71 N.W.2d 307, 309 (1955). A presumption can also arise that a County Board’s determination of taxable “assessed” value is correct. *Constructor's Inc. v. Cass Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb. 866, 606 N.W.2d 786 (2000). A presumption is not, however, evidence of correctness in and of itself, but may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof. See, *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).

If however the “taxable ‘assessed’ value comparison approach” was shown to be a professionally accepted approach for determination of actual value and that the taxable “assessed” value of the proposed comparables was equal to actual value, further analysis would be required. Techniques for use of the approach would have to be developed. Techniques used in the sales comparison approach are instructive. In the sales comparison approach, a sale price is an indication of actual value for a sold property but must be adjusted to account for differences between properties to become an indicator of actual value for another property. *The Appraisal of Real Estate*, Twelfth Edition, Appraisal Institute, Chs 17, 18, 19, (2001). An

analysis of differences and adjustments to the taxable “assessed” value of comparison properties would be necessary to obtain an indication of actual value for a subject property. No adjustments or analysis of adjustments necessary to compensate for differences between the subject property and the taxable “assessed” values of other parcels was presented. Instead of adjustments, the Taxpayer presented an averaging of values. Averages can be dramatically influenced by numbers forming the array particularly when there are few items in the array. The Commission has been unable to find any support in appraisal literature endorsing the use of average values whether assessed or sales values to determine value for a subject property. Averages may have other uses but the specific use presented by the Taxpayer is not an appropriate in this case.

The Taxpayer provided evidence of the sales of four parcels in support of his opinion. Sales of comparable parcels may be used to develop an opinion of value. “comparable properties” share similar quality, architectural attractiveness (style), age, size, amenities, functional utility, and physical condition. *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2nd Ed., International Association of Assessing Officers, 1996, p. 98. When using “comparables” to determine value, similarities and differences between the subject property and the comparables must be recognized. *Property Assessment Valuation*, 2nd Ed., 1996, p.103. The technique used by the Taxpayer was a simple averaging of the Sale\$/SF. (E3:1). Without trying to estimate or make adjustments necessary to render the parcels described in Exhibit 3 comparable the Commission notes that the parcel presented as Comp2 by the Taxpayer is the most similar to the subject property and that if its Sale\$/SF is multiplied by the square feet that the result is near the actual value determined for the subject property ($\$144.37 \times 2,445 = \$352,985$).

A prior year's assessment is not admissible as relevant evidence of value in a subsequent year. *DeVore v. Bd. Of Equal.*, 144 Neb. 351, 13 N.W.2d 451 (1944). *Affiliated Foods Coop v. Madison Co. Bd. Of Equal.*, 229 Neb. 605, 613, 428 N.W.2d 201,206 (1988). In *Affiliated Foods*, the Court ruled that a prior year's determination of value by a District Court was not binding on a County Board in a subsequent year recognizing that the valuation of property as provided by statute could change each year due to circumstances. The rationale of the *Affiliated Foods* Court is not less compelling when applied to a subsequent year's valuation. In this appeal evidence of a subsequent year's determination of actual value for the subject property was received without objection. Presentation of evidence without objection does not make the evidence relevant. Evidence of actual value of the subject property as determined by the County Board for a subsequent year was not considered by the Commission.

The Taxpayer has not produced clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board was unreasonable or arbitrary.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining taxable value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2006, is affirmed.
2. Actual value of the subject property for the tax year 2006 is:

Land value	\$ 30,600.00
Improvement value	<u>\$330,200.00</u>
Total value	<u><u>\$360,800.00.</u></u>
3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Douglas County Treasurer, and the Douglas County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2006.

7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on September 18, 2007.

Signed and Sealed. September 18, 2007.

Wm. R. Wickersham, Commissioner

Nancy J. Salmon, Commissioner

Robert W. Hotz, Commissioner

William C. Warnes, Commissioner

SEAL

ANY PARTY SEEKING REVIEW OF THIS ORDER MAY DO SO BY FILING A PETITION WITH THE APPROPRIATE DOCKET FEES IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS. THE PETITION MUST BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THIS ORDER AND MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF STATE LAW CONTAINED IN NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (CUM. SUPP. 2006). IF A PETITION IS NOT TIMELY FILED, THIS ORDER BECOMES FINAL AND CANNOT BE CHANGED.